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THE VEXING PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY IN
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A PROPOSAL

FERNANDO R. TESÓN∗

INTRODUCTION
As is well known, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
raises a host of thorny issues: the threshold for intervention, the question
of proportionality, the problem of last resort, the dilemma of whether or
not to codify standards and procedures, and so forth. In this paper I will
not address those issues; crucial and controversial as they are;1 I will
assume that they have been somehow settled. I will also assume that it is
desirable to find alternatives to unilateral intervention. The question,
then, becomes this: who should authorize humanitarian intervention?
Any acceptable authorizing procedure must avoid over-intervention and
abuse on the one hand, and under-intervention and inertia on the other.
That is a daunting challenge in institutional design. Recent experiences
show that both dangers are real, and, alas, the victims of such failures
will be flesh and blood human beings, often the most vulnerable.
Before even starting to suggest an appropriate international
procedure for humanitarian intervention, we must clarify what goals or
values those institutions should serve. There are many possible answers
to this: national interest (that is, for each citizen, the interest of his or her
country); individual freedom; the rule of law; etc. I here suggest that the
institutions for humanitarian intervention should serve the cosmopolitan
interest of humanity, as opposed to the national interests of states and
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Professor Tesón is Tobias Simon Eminent Scholar and Professor of Law at Florida State
University. He is known for his scholarship relating political philosophy to international law,
and in particular his defense of humanitarian intervention. He is the author of HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2005).
See generally FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY (2d ed. 2005); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND
POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).
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governments.2 Here I leave undefined the full content of this interest,
because for purposes of intervention it is fairly clear and minimal: to
save persons from tyranny and anarchy, from the most brutal forms of
oppression. (Notice that I talk about the cosmopolitan interest of
humanity and not the interests of the international community, which can
be easily interpreted as the interests of all the governments of the world,
not of the people, and especially not those who are oppressed and
victimized.)
Here I will discuss two alternatives that are on the table, as it
were. The first is to make the United Nations Security Council, perhaps
reformed in some way, the only body empowered to authorize
humanitarian intervention. This is the option favored by a great majority
of governments and scholars as well as by the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).3 In this view, the only
acceptable procedure for humanitarian intervention is to obtain the
authorization of the Security Council. Given the provisions of the UN
Charter, such authorization is deemed to come from the international
community: Article 24(1) expressly acknowledges such delegation of
power.4 Under this conception of legitimate international authority,
neither a regional organization, such as the Organization of American
States, nor a military alliance, such as NATO, can authorize
humanitarian intervention. And, of course, unilateral intervention is
unlawful since it is not a defensive use of force—the only unilateral
military action deemed lawful, it is thought, under the charter.5
The second option, suggested by Allen Buchanan and Robert
Keohane and endorsed by some (including myself), is to create a council
of democratic states with good human rights records and traditions as the
appropriate body to authorize intervention.6 This proposal includes an
array of safeguards to prevent abuse and deception from would-be
interveners as well as to reduce information costs regarding the gravity
of the situation and other factual matters.
2

3

4
5

6

I offer a cosmopolitan reconstruction of international law in FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-26 (1998). See also ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE,
LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2004).
INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
47-55 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.
U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
U.N. Charter art. 33, paras. 1-2. I have criticized this restrictive view at length in TESÓN, supra
note 1, at 164-67, 202-10.
See Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan
Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 1 (2004).
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I will argue here (contrary to what I earlier thought) that none of
those alternatives is satisfactory. The Security Council is dysfunctional
with respect to humanitarian intervention—dysfunctional for the purpose
of protecting human freedom. A council of democratic states, while at
first blush a better alternative, is also undesirable, and, paradoxically, it
may be worse than what we presently have. I will propose here, as an
ideal solution, a new body, the Court of Human Security. Composed of
life-tenured independent judges, this body would be entitled to oversee
not only humanitarian interventions, but also the whole range of
responses, forcible and non-forcible, to humanitarian crises.

I. IS THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE BEST SOURCE OF AUTHORITY?

A. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1990S
It is quite common these days to hear wistful evocations of the
1990s, a time of optimism after the fall of the Soviet Union when the
United States presided over an explosion of global prosperity and
freedom, a time of economic and political globalization where, most of
the time, international interactions really appeared, perhaps for the first
time in a long time, as positive-sum games. There was a general sense
then that the stark logic of the Cold War had given way to endless
possibilities of cooperative behavior for the spread of respect for human
rights and democratic rule and the expansion of free markets and
consequent prosperity.7
An important feature of this era was, of course, the renewed
Security Council. As is known, the Security Council authorized the use
of force to address humanitarian crises on various occasions. This led a
number of observers, myself included, to express optimism about the use
of the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, as an
instrument for the advancement of human dignity and freedom in the
world.8 There was a growing sense that the international community
agreed on the values that it should uphold and that there was an effective
mechanism to promote those values, if necessary, by force. Only rogue
7

8

For an excellent analysis of this period, see Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian
Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL,
LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS, supra note 1, at 232.
See TESÓN, supra note 1, at 279-312.
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states and other recalcitrant dictators remained at the margins. There was
a lessened sense of threat and a reinforced belief in the international
community not just as a community of minimal interest but as a
community of values.
For many, these hopes were shattered by the attacks of
September 11, 2001, and by the sequel in Iraq and elsewhere. The
generalized sense was that the world had returned, with new actors and
new threats, to the zero-sum logic of the Cold War. The radical revolt
against freedom and reason mounted by terrorism could not be
confronted with the tools that had developed during the previous decade.
I share this sentiment to an important degree. However, looking
back, I have concluded that, with respect to humanitarian intervention,
we have unduly romanticized the 1990s. (No doubt some people overpraise the 1990s for partisan reasons, but I’ll ignore that complication
here.) To be sure, the experience of the nineties was preferable to the
deadlock of the Cold War. Most importantly, the Security Council’s
practice laid to rest the doubts that many had about its legal power to
authorize humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Yet, a dispassionate assessment of the practice of the Security
Council during that period discloses a number of serious dysfunctions
and problems.
To begin with, some of those authorized interventions were
unsuccessful. I am thinking primarily of the actions in Somalia and
Rwanda. There were no doubt several reasons for this, but I think that
one important reason was the inability of the Security Council to follow
up, to monitor whether the action by the intervener was apt to achieve the
humanitarian objective. And, in turn, this was caused by the impotence
of the Security Council to curb the intrusion of national interest into the
cosmopolitan humanitarian objective. There was also the question of
dwindling domestic support (in the United States with regard to Somalia,
for example), but that, in turn, can be linked to the tenuous standing of
the authorizing body itself in the eyes of the public. The French
intervention in Rwanda was even more dramatically unsuccessful as it
led to the worst modern case of failure to intervene to prevent genocide
in that country.
In addition, some of the (arguably) successful interventions
suffered from substantive and procedural problems. The intervention in
Haiti, for example, was directed not to prevent or stop massive loss of
life but to reverse an unconstitutional transfer of power. My point is not
that pro-democratic intervention is wrong; on the contrary, (as I’ve
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argued elsewhere) I support pro-democratic intervention in Haiti-like
cases. Rather, my point is that those who support the exclusivity of the
Security Council’s power to authorize intervention have an unresolved
problem. They argue simultaneously that (1) the Security Council has
quasi-absolute discretion in authorizing the use of force; and (2) the
threshold for humanitarian intervention should be set very high, say, at
massive loss of life, genocide, and the like. This view is inconsistent
because the Security Council can authorize the use of force in situations
that do not meet that standard, as it did in Haiti. Supporters of the
Security Council as the authorizing body have not resolved this problem.
I myself do not offer here a general answer but simply flag the issue. In
Sierra Leone in 1997, the Security Council issued a retroactive
authorization in apparent disregard of the common wisdom that
authorization to use force should take place before the operation. Again,
I express no view on this here except to say that the 1990s practice,
which is sometimes praised without reservations, suffered from these
substantive and procedural irregularities under the very theory
presupposed by those who praised that practice.
And even the two authorized interventions that were reasonably
successful, the use of force to protect the Kurds in Iraq in 1991 and
NATO’s bombing of Bosnia in 1994, did not address the root of the
problem in any lasting way, as we now sadly know. Ironically, the most
successful intervention of the 1990s was unauthorized—NATO’s air
campaign in Kosovo in 1998.

B. GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL
So, the 1990s practice yields, I think, mixed results and does not
necessarily support the view that the Security Council is, ideally, the
institution best equipped to enforce the interests of humanity as a whole.
In addition to the lessons drawn from this practice (and maybe as
evidenced by it), there are serious general problems with the Security
Council that make it dysfunctional for humanitarian intervention.
1. Incentives
I have suggested that the interest in ending or preventing
humanitarian crises is a cosmopolitan humanitarian interest, an interest
that springs, as it were, from universal moral concerns that affect, and
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reside in, humanity. States, on the other hand, have national interests,
and international organizations are the fora where those interests clash or
converge and are therefore hardly a depository of cosmopolitan
humanitarian values. The Security Council is no exception.
2. Inertia
The second problem with the Security Council, noted by many,
is the danger of inertia, which leads, of course, to under-intervention.
This was the case in Rwanda in 1994 and is the case today in Darfur, and
there are other examples. (I would include Iraq but don’t want to open
that front in the debate,9 as it is not necessary for my argument here.)
The veto rules, by their very nature, are biased toward inaction. But even
without taking the veto into account, any resolution needs nine votes.
Even in the 1990s, action by the Security Council was only
possible because the United States was able to threaten or bribe council
members (permanent and non-permanent) into acquiescence or support.
That the available procedure to end massacres depends on one member
being able to bribe or threaten others in order to get their votes to stop
the massacres does not seem to be a very solid basis for any institutional
framework. (Luckily, that hegemonic member is the United States,
which, for all its failures, is sympathetic to freedom. Imagine what
would happen if the hegemon were an “evil empire” inimical to human
rights.) In short, the whole process seems removed from a cosmopolitan
concern for humanity.
3. Arbitrariness of Veto Power
The third problem is the moral arbitrariness of the veto power.
Being a permanent member is an accident of history, and while some of
the permanent members, because of their decent human rights records,
may be better guardians of human freedom, others are not. And at any
rate, it is not clear why even the decent permanent members of the
Security Council should have more of a say on humanitarian matters than
non-permanent members with equal or better human rights records. Of
course, there is the problem of internalization of costs: it may be argued
that states like the United States that will bear the brunt of intervention
should have a veto on these matters. It is easy for Finland or Belgium to
9

See Fernando R. Tesón, Ending Tyranny in Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 1, 1 (2004).
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send Americans to fight. However, this view overlooks that we are
talking about permission to use force, not obligation to do so, at least in
the current state of world organization; therefore absence of veto power
does not mean that unwilling states would have to intervene.
4. Moral Legitimacy Deficit
The fourth problem is what I will call the Security Council’s
deficit in moral legitimacy. By this I do not mean what some authors
have decried as the lack of geographical representation (lack of diversity,
as it were) in the Security Council. On the contrary, with regard to
humanitarian intervention, the fact that the Security Council is dominated
by the West is one of its good features because (as much as political
correctness seems to inhibit people from saying this) Western powers
tend to be friendlier to human rights and democracy than others. What I
mean is that voting and veto rights in the council are given to regimes
that are tyrannical or otherwise unrepresentative. As is well known, no
human rights credentials are required to serve on the Security Council.
One of its permanent members, China, is a notorious human rights
violator; another one, Russia, has serious deficiencies in that area. In
addition, various tyrannical regimes at various times have served as nonpermanent members. The problem here is twofold: first, governments
that are human rights-unfriendly should not have the power to authorize
or to veto prospective interventions. Second, undemocratic regimes do
not represent their peoples, and therefore, on any plausible theory of
agency or representation, their vote is morally blighted.
In the light of these deficiencies, the insistence that all
humanitarian interventions should be approved by the Security Council
reveals, I think, the lawyer’s misplaced faith on process. Lawyers like
process, any process. Maintaining the forms of law is to them important;
so if there is in place an international decision-making procedure that
involves voting, for example, then only this process will yield legitimate
decisions. But the moral currency of any process is surely parasitic on
the credentials of those who participate in it. To give a grotesque
example, there is no value in the decision-making process that took
place, say, within the Taliban’s inner “cabinet.” A decision by the
Taliban leadership to stone women alive for adultery is not legitimized
by members of the government voting to that effect any more than
procedurally regular voting by the Mafia’s governing council legitimizes
the decision to perpetrate criminal acts. Procedures in the United
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Nations organs, such as the Security Council, give the illusion of
democratic legitimacy because, after all, governments are voting, and
there are procedures in place to adopt decisions. It looks like a
democratic legislature, but it takes little reflection to see that United
Nations procedures are very distant from democratic procedures.
Democratic majority rule as a basis for collective decisions is
engrafted in an individualistic political theory, in a constitution, that
limits government and secures freedom or similar values. Because the
international system does not secure individual freedom from rulers, the
voting procedures have no moral currency. They represent, at best,
procedures to secure a modus vivendi among rulers, but they are in no
sense democratic, as that word is understood in political theory. Because
of this deficit, the decisions to assist victims of grievous injustice should
not depend on the acquiescence of rulers who at the very least do not
represent their people and at the very worst are tyrants themselves.

II. IS A COUNCIL OF DEMOCRATIC STATES A BETTER ALTERNATIVE?
In an important article, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane
have proposed a complex system to oversee the use of force.10 While
their article deals with preventive war, they expressly suggest that the
proposal can be extended to cover authorization for humanitarian
interventions. They propose a system of sanctions designed to prevent
abuses and misinformation on the part of prospective interveners. A
central part of their proposal is to create a council of democratic states as
an authorizing body should the Security Council be paralyzed by veto.
This proposal appears as an improvement over the present system, given
the aforementioned criticism of the Security Council, because if
members are really democratic and really concerned with the
cosmopolitan interest of humanity, the chances of effective and fairminded decisions are significantly increased.
I am very sympathetic with this proposal, as shown by the fact
that, until today, I had supported it. It fits nicely with my own Kantian
normative view of international relations, where the hope for freedom
and peace rests with an alliance of liberal states.11 However, I have to
concede, reluctantly, that these hopes are unrealistic and that this

10
11

Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 6.
See generally TESÓN, supra note 2.
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proposal cannot possibly work for a number of reasons related to the
distortion of the meaning of human rights and the rhetorical use of
human rights language to mask self-interest or hostility to individual
freedom or free markets or both. This problem is endemic to the United
Nations human rights machinery and to human rights scholarship, and,
alas, it sometimes infects human rights NGOs themselves.
The problem is illustrated by the recent creation of a new United
Nations organ, the Human Rights Council (HRC). The HRC was
supposed to replace the largely ineffective and politicized Human Rights
Commission. A crucial issue, of course, is who would serve. Is any
government, regardless of their human rights record, eligible to serve?
As is known, Western powers failed to establish a voting system and
criteria for membership aimed at excluding tyrants from the HRC.12 As
the rules stand now, tyrants will be elected to the HRC. (It is a sad
comment on the human rights commitment by the so-called international
community that the United States and a few others were the only ones to
vote against this masquerade.) Buchanan and Keohane could retort that
this flawed HRC is not what they had in mind and that an appropriate
“pure” council of democratic states could get the job done. This reply,
however, is insufficient, for at least two reasons.
First, many governments (supported here, sadly, by many
academics) manipulate the concept of human rights in various ways in
order to dilute worries about tyranny and oppression and make tyrants
more respectable. One way in which this is done, especially within the
United Nations human rights system, is by advancing the thesis of
equivalence of civil/political rights and socio/economic rights.13 This
deplorable doctrine allows brutal regimes that somehow can show
economic improvement in some area to say that they are as good, or as
bad, as those states that guarantee liberal freedoms and the rule of law.
So, on this view, Cuba is no worse than Norway.
The other strategy to dilute human rights criticism is to
exaggerate the gravity of violations by states that traditionally respect
human rights. Thus, the fact that the United States resorted to illegal
methods of interrogation or that it established military commissions is
12

13

See Scott R. Lyons, The New United Nations Human Rights Council, ASIL INSIGHTS, Mar. 27,
2006, http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/03/insights060327.html.
Thus, for example, the 1993 Vienna Declaration proclaims that “All human rights are universal,
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human
rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.”
World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, ¶ 5, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
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regarded by critics of the West as a crime as serious as, say, the mass
starvation and total suppression of civil liberties caused by the brutal
North Korean regime. And a host of other regimes get off the hook as a
result of this piece of propaganda: all the Muslim countries, including
Iran, are able to say, with a straight face, that next to the United States
they look pretty good. Of course, this is not new: during the Cold War,
many people (and sadly, many academics) thought that, say, the pathetic
attempt of Senator McCarthy to undermine freedom in the United States
was morally equivalent to the thirty million people slaughtered by Stalin
and the Soviet Gulags. So it is virtually impossible to get the United
Nations to create a body with the characteristics that Buchanan and
Keohane propose simply because anti-Western sentiment in the United
Nations has succeeded in disfiguring the notion of human rights beyond
all recognition.
I should pause here to say that, properly understood, civil and
political rights are not, perhaps, the only moral-political values that
matter. I believe that governments have an obligation to try to alleviate
world poverty. I also believe that an important first step to achieve this
is to promote open trade and freer immigration (but I cannot pursue the
issue here14). However, from a philosophical standpoint, securing
freedom (civil and political rights) has lexical priority over economic
policy (for a number of reasons I cannot go into here), and, importantly,
civil and political rights are the ones that are at the center of the
humanitarian intervention doctrine (although I would include extreme
deprivation as a possible rationale as well).
Second, as I pointed out above, the incentives that governments
have are dysfunctional with respect to humanitarian intervention. The
crucial failure here is caused by the logic of empire. More often than
not, the United Nations has become a forum where many countries,
including European countries, band together to frustrate the preferences
of the United States, the world’s only superpower. Advocating more
power for the United Nations has become synonymous with curbing the
power of the United States. Maybe this is a good thing, maybe not. I
would say that it is a good thing if the United States wants to do
something bad, and it is a bad thing if the United States wants to do
something good. I am one of those who still believe that the United
States is a force for good in the world (a dwindling crowd, it seems). But
be that as it may, countries in the “democratic council” animated with a
14

See Fernando R. Tesón and Jonathan Klick, Global Justice, Trade, and Poverty: A Case of
Discourse Failure (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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desire to collectively contain United States power can hardly be expected
to care about the cosmopolitan interest of humanity. If it is more
important to contain imperialism than to free Iraq from the brutal rule of
Saddam Hussein, then millions of persons will continue to suffer.
The experience of the establishment of the Human Rights
Council shows this very clearly. The coalition of fifty-six Islamic states,
of which only two (Turkey and Iraq) are democratic, can block the
United States (or Denmark, for example, on account of having allowed
the newspaper cartoons) from being elected to the Council. Again, it is
hard to believe that, given current animosities between various groups of
states and, in particular, animosity against the United States, those whose
task should be to aid helpless victims of tyranny and anarchy will really
be effective in doing so.

III. A TENTATIVE PROPOSAL: THE COURT OF HUMAN SECURITY
To alleviate these problems, I propose to create a new
international court, the Court of Human Security (CHS). The CHS
would not be composed of governments or government representatives
but of judges of undisputed integrity who are demonstrably
knowledgeable about human rights, human freedom, and human security
and demonstrably committed to the respect of human rights and genuine
democracy.
I will not offer many specifics except to say that the selection
and tenure of the judges should make them as independent as possible
from governments. This requirement is crucial. The selection procedure
must improve upon the one that governs the election of the magistrates of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ is, I am sad to say, not
entirely above suspicion in terms of impartiality, as shown by the recent
advisory opinion on the wall that Israel is building on the occupied
territories.15 Perhaps one way to do this is to grant judges life tenure, as
U.S. federal judges have (the ICJ judges are elected for nine-year
periods). But that alone will not be enough. Persons who were
government officials (other than judges) or politicians should not be
eligible. Again, the main requirement is knowledge about, and
15

See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2004 I.C.J. (Gen. List) No. 131 (July 9) (forthcoming), available at 2004 WL 3587211 *136,
*241 (Advisory Opinion) (Declaration of Buergenthal, J.) (complaining of the Court’s refusal to
even consider the security interests of Israel).

772

Wisconsin International Law Journal

commitment to, individual freedom and democracy. The selection
procedure should minimize the role of governments and expand the role
of demonstrably non-partisan NGOs and other disinterested civil groups
(not lobbyists or other political operatives).
The CHS would hear the evidence ex ante for any proposed
intervention and would grant or refuse “warrants” to intervene, along the
lines suggested by Buchanan and Keohane. This, of course, will not stop
a powerful state, but it would significantly raise the costs of going ahead.
One can even imagine, as these authors do, a system of sanctions for
cases in which the applicant misrepresents the evidence. The CHS,
however, would not be able to mandate intervention since military action
is always permissible, not obligatory. It is a function of the resources of
the state, and I cannot see how it can be made legally mandatory. The
typical case, then, would be a state or coalition that contemplates
intervention. The CHS would then hear the applicant in court, and,
within a reasonable time dictated by urgency, it would authorize or
refuse the intervention.
One of the obvious criticisms of this idea is that it is utopian.
But I do not see why it is more or less utopian than the ICJ was when it
was first proposed in the early twentieth century or than the International
Criminal Court or than all the various other courts that we have dealing
with crimes of war and crimes against humanity. Only a short while ago
it was unthinkable that the world could make dictators accountable for
their atrocities. In fact, this idea seems to me a priori more utopian than
the idea of an independent court authorizing humanitarian intervention.

IV. CONCLUSION
My conclusion is grim. In the present circumstances, no state or
group of states can serve as an acceptable authorizing body.
Governments are caught in the logic of empire: the world’s superpower
wants to get its way, and the rest of the world uses international
organizations like the UN as a means to curb the superpower’s will. The
United States, sensing this, resorts to unilateral behavior. Neither one
nor the other, caught in this gigantic prisoner’s dilemma, will be in a
position to advance the cosmopolitan interest of humanity.

